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6	DDA		X		
7	DDO		X		
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9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OCA		X		
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Remarks

[Signature] Executive Secretary

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Executive Registry

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December 18, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

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SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation: General Powell's
Meeting with V. A. Kryuchkov -- December 2 (S)

Attached is a memorandum of conversation of General Powell's
meeting with V. A. Kryuchkov, Deputy Chairman of the KGB.
It is our recommendation that this document receive exceptionally
limited distribution. (S)

Paul Schott Stevens
Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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91336NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

PARTIAL MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: General Powell's Meeting with
V.A. Kryuchkov (S)

PARTICIPANTS: US
General Colin L. Powell
Assistant Secretary of State
Rozanne Ridgway
Fritz W. Ermarth, NSC Staff (Notetaker)

USSR
Deputy Chairman of the KGB
V. A. Kryuchkov
Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr
Bessmertnykh
Ambassador Yuri Dubinin
Boris Marchuk, Second Secretary
Yevgeniy Zolotov (Interpreter)

DATE, TIME AND PLACE: December 2, 1987, 11:00 a.m.-12:00 p.m.
General Powell's Office (U)

Following discussion of summit scheduling matters between General Powell and Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, V.A. Kryuchkov, Deputy Chairman of the KGB and head of its First Main (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate, gave a soliloquy on security issues. (S)

After being assured that the meeting could continue beyond the half-hour allotted, Kryuchkov said he wanted to join Bessmertnykh in expressing thanks for the hospitality and support shown by the US side to the Soviet advance team, especially the help of the Secret Service. It had shown full concern for the security problems of the visit, about which Kryuchkov was very pleased. The Soviet security detail was getting practical advice, learning new things, and enjoying a friendly rapport with their American counterparts. (S)

There were two aspects to the security of the visit, Kryuchkov said, political and operational. On the political side, an improved political climate was being sought and needed. He noted a constructive article about the USSR in the Washington Times of that day and was aware that this was unusual for this paper. He opined that the White House had had a positive influence (which General Powell denied, but cheerfully took credit for).

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Kryuchkov noted that the time before, during, and after the summit required a stress on the positive, and that simple courtesies in the two sides' treatment of each other were of significant value. He said any advice and recommendations from the US side regarding security concerns would be warmly appreciated. (S)

As regards security per se, Kryuchkov said, he was impressed by the rich experience of the Secret Service, from which, he mentioned again, the Soviet side was learning a lot. The USSR, he noted, was fully ready to learn from others, and not shy about drawing on the universe of human experience. (S)

The Soviet side had given the US side information it had which was of concern, about extremist and terrorist groups who could pose a real threat. The Soviet side had reports (signals) from many friends and sources about such threats, and was taking the necessary measures. Kryuchkov said he thought the FBI would know even more. So, he urged, we should share any available information. This could have, he said, a "preemptive result" for comparable cooperation when the President visits the Soviet Union. (S)

While many Americans welcomed the summit, Kryuchkov observed, there were also elements that were unfriendly and could put matters on an undesirable path. Kryuchkov asked particularly that the US side pay attention to the security of Soviet institutions and citizens in Washington. Not Americans, but some Afghans or descendents of other nationalities harbored anti-Soviet feelings by reason of their origins. These forces, he felt, could create certain trends and moods, and some unpleasantness was to be expected. (S)

Kryuchkov said he intended no lecture, that the American side knew the dangers. This visit, he said, was a most important one for Mikhail Sergeievich Gorbachev, a leader loved and respected by his country. Kryuchkov also noticed respect for Gorbachev in the US. So, he felt, all details required could be worked out. He again expressed thanks for the hospitality and support he had found, and noted this on behalf of other senior members of the Soviet summit delegation, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, and Dobrynin. He also remarked on the comforts of the Madison Hotel, where the advance team was lodged, a facility with which the US government no doubt had good contacts. (Kryuchkov made a reference to faces he'd "seen before" apparently to convey his suspicions about surveillance.) It had been decided that Gorbachev would stay at the Ambassador's residence at the invitation of the Ambassador. And, interjected Ambassador Dubinin, at the urging of other Soviet leaders. (S)

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Kryuchkov then turned to the matter of the Gorbachev press conference planned for the end of the summit. The Soviet side had considered all options and decided that the auditorium in the new Soviet embassy compound was the best. Yes, he said, the Soviet Union had a new embassy. General Powell exclaimed ironically, "Really?" Using it, Kryuchkov went on, seemed to irritate the Soviet ambassador, to which General Powell responded that perhaps it is best to keep ambassadors irritated. Kryuchkov continued, saying that the superior security of the new Soviet embassy compound's club auditorium would take a burden off the US side. He felt he could expect full understanding of this decision. Kryuchkov then said something about the two sides jointly inspecting their embassies which neither General Powell nor Ermarth understood. An attempt will be made to clarify. (S)

Kryuchkov said he was something of an Americanist, but not as expert as Dubinin and Bessmertnykh. He had gained impressions of America, and regarded its values with respect. The summit was primarily, he said, an encounter for business, to promote new cooperation and interaction. Looking to the future, he suggested that, if the US side had some issues to broach, it should get in touch. Any exchange of information about the general political situation or other issues would be broadening and edifying. (S)

General Powell said he would respond, as he always sought to, with complete candor. He assured the Soviet side that security issues were receiving the highest consideration, he was working on them personally, they were getting the attention of the best people. The Secret Service was in daily contact with the Soviet team on security matters. Every contingency was being considered. As to reciprocal information exchange, General Powell said he would talk to the appropriate officials and assured that we would be responsive. (S)

General Powell went on to say that the USG had definitely preferred an alternative site for the Soviet press conference. But the decision was the Soviet side's and the US posed no objection. But, he continued, he had to warn the Soviet side that holding the press conference on Mt. Alto would draw congressional attention to a sensitive matter. Kryuchkov asked whether only Congress considered it sensitive. General Powell replied that the American public was also concerned about our embassy security problem over several years. The presence of press events and meetings of business leaders at the new Soviet embassy compound would merely focus public and congressional attention on a problem that needed a lot more work to resolve. (S)

Bessmertnykh interjected that no meeting with business leaders was planned for the new Soviet embassy compound, only the press conference. General Powell said it was the Soviets' decision and

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asked whether it was large enough. Kryuchkov replied that a facility four or five times the size will still not meet all demands, but that the Soviet side actually wished to use a smaller facility to keep the numbers down, favoring non-Soviet over Soviet journalists. (S)

General Powell assured his Soviet visitors that the USG would see to the security of Soviet facilities and he would pass on their concerns to the right people. As to the overall political situation, he continued, the American people favored the visit of the General Secretary and his wife and looked forward to it with great pleasure. There were, indeed, some discordant voices; even the President had his detractors. Such was the nature of our system. The US side was working hard to assure the best events, the best setting, the best logistic support for a completely successful and pleasant meeting. Unlike Geneva and Reykjavik, this summit would be a state visit and a very public event at which Gorbachev would speak publicly at least four times, at the arrival ceremony, at the signing ceremony, in an address to the US and Soviet peoples, and at his press conference. (S)

At that point the discussion returned to details of scheduling.
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